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SPEAKING OF SCIENCE: INTRODUCING NOTICE AND COMMENT
INTO THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
Gregory Dolin, M.D.*
Abstract
Congress enacts, on a nearly continuous basis, a variety of laws
that affect scientific research and progress. Some of these laws have an
unquestionably positive effect. For instance, Congress’s creation of the
National Institutes of Health, the National Academy of Sciences, and
NASA; its various appropriations to fund ground-breaking research; and
a multitude of other laws have incalculably advanced human knowledge,
and it is to Congress’s great credit that these laws have been and are
continuing to be enacted. However, not all laws that affect the progress
of sciences are an unalloyed good. Quite the opposite, often the laws aim
to, and in fact do, retard the progress of scientific research. The question
is then whether the benefit from those laws outweighs the costs imposed
on scientific progress.
Congress, however, often does not fully consider the costs that the
legislation imposes on science, either for lack of information or as a
result of conscious disregard for the views of a politically insignificant
group. The public is not able to hold Congress accountable because it
lacks an ability to participate in the process and lacks an objective basis
against which to measure congressional action. The problem is not
congressional malfeasance or ignorance but rather the structure of the
legislative process itself. The general public is often taught and told that
lawmaking is a process that begins in a committee where the proposal is
carefully studied, debated, amended, and voted on. The reality, of course,
is much different. First, bills often skip the committee process, and
amendments are often added last minute without a chance for a
meaningful debate. But even where the process is followed, it is often
hard to portray the committee hearings as a true deliberative process.
Instead, they are often described as a Kabuki theater, where the Chair
and the Ranking Member designate the witnesses they wish to call to
support the preformulated position. Interested parties cannot provide
testimony unless asked to do so by the relevant committee. Thus,
oftentimes the people with the deepest knowledge, but low political skills,
* © 2014 Gregory Dolin. Associate Professor of Law, Co-Director, Center for
Medicine & Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. Adjunct Associate Professor of
Emergency Medicine, The Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine. B.A., The Johns
Hopkins University; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; M.D., State University of
New York at Stony Brook. I am thankful to Irina Manta, Erin Sheley, Tara Helfman, David
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are cut out of the process. The end result is that Congress votes on
legislation without fully understanding the implication thereof. The
voters also are injured in that it is hard to hold Congress accountable if
one cannot point out that it ignored the views of the scientific
communities.
This Article proposes a solution to the problem. Bills that affect the
progress of science ought to be evaluated by an independent body
similar to the Congressional Budget Office. Like the CBO, this body
would not have any authority to block a bill, but it would be able to
“score” it (i.e., provide information on the effect the bill will have on
research). In order to accomplish its task, this newly created body would
be required to provide notice of pending legislation and then seek
comments from the interested parties, much like what is done in the
administrative rulemaking process. The comments then would be
collected and analyzed, and the final report would be presented to
Congress before it votes. Congress would continue to be able to vote as it
pleases, but with this process in place, it would be forced to do so with
its eyes wide open. By understanding the full scope and the implication
for the scientific progress of the bills it wishes to enact, Congress would
produce better legislation, which would be less detrimental to the
scientific progress.
I. INTRODUCTION
Otto von Bismarck is rumored to have quipped that “legislation is like
sausage: it’s better not to watch it being made.” 1 It may well have been sound
advice when the laws were made in service of a monarchy without much
consideration of the views or desires of the populace. Americans, however, “have
ignored this advice and have widely subscribed to the view that a truly democratic
people must have access to governmental decision-making . . . .” 2 Yet, despite an
expectation of public participation, in reality the public is often shut out from the
legislative process. This exclusion creates three distinct though interrelated
problems, especially when Congress legislates in areas that deal with science and
technology. First, when Congress legislates in these areas, it tends to prove
Bismarck correct because it legislates in the dark, without understanding the
underlying issues or the full impact that legislation is likely to have on the progress

1

Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax Legislative
Processes, 43 B.C. L. REV. 863, 870 n.28 (2002). The quote is likely apocryphal, but it is
oft quoted by lawyers and judges alike, despite there being no definitive proof that
Bismarck actually uttered these words. Alexander M. Sanders, Jr., Newgarth Revisited:
Mrs. Robinson’s Case, 49 S.C. L. REV. 407, 412 n.18 (1998).
2
James Bowen, Behind Closed Doors: Re-Examining the Tennessee Open Meetings
Act and Its Inapplicability to the Tennessee General Assembly, 35 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 133, 133 (2002).
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of sciences. 3 Second, even when Congress is aware of the potential negative effect
that the legislation will have on the progress of sciences, it often prefers not to
acknowledge that effect, instead focusing on the benefits that the bill would bring
to certain political constituencies. 4 This lack of recognition of the negative effects
in turn diminishes Congress’s democratic accountability because Congress never
faces a definitive warning about the scientific effects of its legislative activity. In
other words, the fact that Congress ignored a warning from experts would allow
the public to conclude that a law’s negative effects were not “unintended
consequences,” but instead, a case of willful disregard of expert opinion. Third, the
current legislative process tends to diminish trust in the system because the
affected parties do not believe that they had opportunities to convey their concerns
or that their concerns were considered. The solution, however, is not to avert our
gaze, as Bismarck recommended, but to improve the process so that the result is as
worthy as sausages are tasty.
Congress enacts, on a nearly continuous basis, a variety of laws that affect
scientific research and progress. Some of these laws have an unquestionably
positive effect. For instance, Congress’s creation of the National Institutes of
Health, 5 the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), 6 and NASA; 7 its various
appropriations to fund ground-breaking research; 8 and a multitude of other laws
have incalculably advanced human knowledge, and it is to Congress’s great credit
that these laws have been and are continuing to be enacted. However, not all laws
that affect the progress of sciences are an unalloyed good. Quite the opposite, often

3

See Cornelia Dean, Groups Call for Scientists to Engage the Body Politic, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 9, 2011, at D1 (“[A]ccording to the Congressional Research Service, the
technically trained among the 435 members of the House include one physicist, 22 people
with medical training (including 2 psychologists and a veterinarian), a chemist, a
microbiologist and 6 engineers.”).
4
Cf. Megan Creek Frient, Note, Similar Harm Means Similar Claims: Doing Away
with Davis v. Bandemer’s Discriminatory Effect Requirement in Political Gerrymandering
Cases, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 617, 644–45 (1998) (“Since the incumbent from the
politically gerrymandered district knows he or she represents an area which has been
crafted so that a majority of the residents share his or her political views, the representative
has no incentive to acknowledge other voters’ concerns: Safe districts remove the incentive
to grant political concessions to constituent interests or create electoral coalitions [that]
ensure representation of diverse points of view. In fact, granting the minority party’s point
of view deference in a gerrymandered district would be foolish. The representative would
risk offending the constituents whose support the district was designed to guarantee.”
(alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
5
Ransdell Act, Pub. L. No. 71-251, 46 Stat. 379–80 (1930).
6
Act to Incorporate The National Academy of Sciences, ch. 111, 12 Stat. 803, 806
(1863).
7
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568, 72 Stat. 426
(current version at 51 U.S.C. § 20103 (Supp. IV 2010)).
8
See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786
(2011); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 3 (2004).
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the laws aim to, and in fact do, retard the progress of scientific research.9 The
question is, then, whether the benefit from those laws outweighs the costs imposed
on scientific progress. At one extreme, consider the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 10
The treaty certainly had the effect of limiting the study of nuclear physics.11 Yet,
there is some value in banning nuclear tests, and Congress has attempted to strike a
balance between the two. 12 The problem is that too many laws are enacted without
any serious consideration of these costs and benefits because these laws are written
and passed without the full understanding or acknowledgment of the impact that
they will have on scientific research. 13
These problems can be ameliorated by furnishing unbiased scientific analysis
to Congress, provided that such analysis is furnished in a language that is both
neutral and comprehensible to an average member of Congress. Members of
Congress, of course, would not be obliged to change their vote on the basis of any
particular report, but the very presence of such a report would provide a solid
political basis on which to evaluate the member’s commitment to science and
scientific progress. Furthermore, to the extent that Congress deliberately rejects
9

See Steven Goldberg, The Reluctant Embrace: Law and Science in America, 75
GEO. L.J. 1341, 1366 (1987) (“To give examples of legal restrictions on technology is to
survey much of modern American law. . . . Food and drug law has become recognized as a
discrete area of study that includes cases where new products have been delayed in
reaching the market or prevented from doing so altogether. In other areas, ranging from
communications to computers, regulation is a fact of modern life. At the state level, statutes
and judicial decisions, concerning, for example, malpractice, products liability, and
exposure to radioactive materials, have subjected technology to extraordinarily close
scrutiny.”).
10
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
11
See Winston P. Nagan & Erin K. Slemmens, Developing U.S. Nuclear Weapons
Policy and International Law: The Approach of the Obama Administration, 19 TUL. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 41, 76 (2010) (“[T]he nuclear weapons problem is one that deeply
implicates science and technology. A relevant role from modern international law is to
come to grips with the possibilities and limitations of science and technology in order to
provide the goal guidance that is both relevant and steeped in realism.”); Eric Schmitt,
Experts Say Test Ban Could Impair Nuclear-Arms Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1999, at
A11.
12
For example, the United States ratified the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, supra
note 10, but balked at ratifying the new Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. See 145
CONG. REC. 25,143 (1999) (rejecting the Treaty by a vote of forty-eight to fifty-one). One
of the reasons for the opposition to the Treaty was the stated effect on scientific testing. See
Schmitt, supra note 11.
13
See Valerie M. Fogleman, Regulating Science: An Evaluation of the Regulation of
Biotechnology Research, 17 ENVTL. L. 183, 191–92 (1987) (“Scientists argue that risks of
experimentation in biotechnology cannot be discussed rationally unless participants
understand the subject matter. . . . According to many scientists, rapidly-moving research
simply is not amenable to safety regulations by nonscientific decision makers. . . . Public
participants in scientific discussions tend to be intimidated by scientists, and are hesitant to
raise technical issues for fear of embarrassment.” (footnotes omitted)).
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warnings provided in any such analysis, the judiciary will be able to better evaluate
whether Congress actually meant to reach what may in a vacuum be viewed as
“absurd results.” 14 In other words, if Congress actually considered a particular
result and determined that the occurrence of such a result is not problematic, the
courts would then be hard pressed to hold that this very result is “absurd.” This
Article proposes the creation of an advisory body—the Congressional Scientific
Office—that would be able to provide unbiased scientific advice to members of
Congress with respect to any pending bill or amendment. Such an advisory body
would greatly improve the legislative process, as well as have a beneficial effect on
the ability of the public to hold their elected representatives accountable for the
votes these representatives cast.
Part II discusses what the general public often learns about the lawmaking
process versus the actual reality of the process. According to civics textbooks, the
lawmaking process begins in a committee where the proposal is carefully studied,
debated, amended, and voted on. Then, the process is repeated on the floor of the
House of Representatives and then again, from scratch, in the Senate. The reality,
of course, is much different. First, bills often skip the committee process, and
amendments are often added last minute without a chance for a meaningful debate.
But even where the process is followed, it is often hard to portray the committee
hearings as a true deliberative process. Instead, they are often described as a
Kabuki theater, 15 where the chair and the ranking member designate the witnesses
they wish to call to support the preformulated position. 16 Interested parties cannot
provide testimony unless asked to do so by the relevant committee. 17 Thus,
14

See generally Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892)
(engaging in statutory interpretation by looking at the implicated statute’s words and
viewing Congress’s petitions and testimony behind the statute in order to analyze whether
the congressional intent of the statute was the actual result or if such a result was absurd).
15
See Caprice L. Roberts, Discretion & Deference in Senate Consideration of
Judicial Nominations, 51 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1, 6 (2012). While most criticisms focus
on nomination, especially judicial nomination hearings, legislative hearings are little
different. See infra notes 34–37 and accompanying text.
16
Lisa O. Monaco, Comment, Give the People What They Want: The Failure of
“Responsive” Lawmaking, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 735, 761–62 (1996) (“Because
of the unique control that committee chairs have over the design and content of hearings—
including who testifies and on what—testimony at hearings may be viewed as simply an
additional forum for interest group influence in the form of witnesses. It is up to the chair
to decide the extent to which individuals will be heard by the committee or to which their
written views will be placed in the committee record. . . . In general, the committee chair
retains power to set the agenda and format of any hearings and determine all witnesses in
consultation with the ranking member of the minority party on the committee.”).
17
See Clay Calvert, The First Amendment, the Media and the Culture Wars: Eight
Important Lessons From 2004 About Speech, Censorship, Science and Public Policy, 41
CAL. W. L. REV. 325, 341–47 (2005) (describing a hearing on adult industry where only
scientists opposed to pornography were invited to participate, but those holding contrary
views or questioning the basis of the studies presented to the committee were not); Peter
DiCola & Matthew Sag, An Information-Gathering Approach to Copyright Policy, 34
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oftentimes, the people with the deepest knowledge are cut out of the process, 18
either because their views do not fit the preformulated agenda or because the
information they convey cannot, in any event, be processed by nonexpert
congressmen. The end result is that Congress votes on legislation without fully
understanding the implications thereof. 19 The voters are also injured because it is
hard to hold Congress accountable if one cannot point out that it ignored the views
of the scientific communities. 20
Part III discusses a specific example of uninformed legislating and its effect
on scientific progress. The Dickey-Wicker Amendment was enacted in 1996 as
part of the annual appropriation process. 21 The Amendment bars federal funding
for any research on a human embryo, which is in turn defined as any organism
“derived by fertilization, parthenogenesis, cloning, or any other means from one or
more human gametes.” 22 This rider was enacted without any separate vote on the
issue and was attached to “must-pass” legislation. 23 It has been reenacted every
year since 1996. 24 The problem is that in enacting this legislation, no one
considered whether differences between fertilization, cloning, and parthenogenesis
exist, and if so, whether they are of sufficient magnitude to treat each process
differently. 25 As it turns out, such differences do exist, 26 yet they were not taken
CARDOZO L. REV. 173, 189 (2012) (“[T]he information Congress receives . . . is limited by
the set of parties invited to participate.”).
18
Cf. Monaco, supra note 16, at 762 (“[W]itnesses reflecting minority viewpoints are
often heard from last and end up speaking to few Members and empty hearing rooms.”).
19
See Fogleman, supra note 13, at 189–92.
20
Lotte E. Feinberg, Open Government and Freedom of Information: Fishbowl
Accountability?, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 375–77 (Philip J.
Cooper & Chester A. Newland eds., 1997) (stating that for electoral accountability,
“citizens must have access to information about what their government is doing and how
decisions have been reached”); see also Joseph S. Alonzo, Restoring the Ideal
Marketplace: How Recognizing Bloggers as Journalists Can Save the Press, 9 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 751, 752 (2006) (“Broad availability of information is an essential
element of a strong democracy—quality collective decision-making and electoral
accountability both depend upon an informed polity.”).
21
Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 128, 110 Stat. 26, 34
(1996).
22
Id.
23
See Omnibus FY96 Bill Ties Loose Ends, in 52 CONG. Q. ALMANAC, at 10-5, 10-19
(1996) (discussing the background of the 1996 Omnibus Appropriations).
24
O. Carter Snead, Science, Public Bioethics, and the Problem of Integration, 43 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1529, 1546 (2010).
25
As discussed in Part III, the bill was written, considered, passed, and signed within
forty-eight hours, leaving essentially no time to debate the merits of any of its provisions.
See Bill Summary & Status, 104th Congress (1995–1996), H.R. 2880, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?&n=BSS&c=104 (search
“Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, I” and select first link).
26
See generally Sarah Rodriguez et al., An Obscure Rider Obstructing Science: The
Conflation of Parthenotes with Embryos in the Dickey-Wicker Amendment, 11 AM. J.
BIOETHICS 20 (2011) (describing how parthenogenesis is scientifically and ethically
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into account, precisely because no one asked the right question, there was no one
in the room to answer it, and perhaps the sponsors of legislation did not want to
hear the answer. The Dickey-Wicker Amendment has stymied research in areas
such as fertility, assisted reproductive technologies, and stem cells, all because of
Congress’s basic lack of understanding of the underlying scientific principles. 27
Part IV of the Article proposes a solution to the problem. Bills that affect the
progress of science ought to be evaluated by an independent body similar to the
Congressional Budget Office. 28 Like the CBO, this body would not have any
authority to block a bill, but it would be able to “score” it (i.e., provide information
on the effect the bill will have on research). 29 In order to accomplish its task, this
newly created body would be required to provide notice of pending legislation and
then seek comments from the interested parties, much like what is done in the
administrative rulemaking process. 30 The comments would then be collected and
analyzed with the final report presented to Congress before it votes. Congress will
continue to be able to vote as it pleases, but with this process in place, it will be
forced to do so with its eyes wide open. By understanding the full scope and the
implication for the scientific progress of the bills it wishes to enact, Congress will
produce better legislation, which will be less detrimental to scientific progress. If
representatives choose to ignore the opinions of experts, voters will be able to hold
their representatives accountable.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: MYTHS AND REALITIES
Millions of Americans think of the legislative process by reference to
Schoolhouse Rock’s I’m Just a Bill 31 and Jimmy Stewart’s Mr. Smith Goes to
Washington. 32 The process that is imprinted in the public’s mind is one with
exhaustive debates in the committees and on the floor, where the views of people,
most likely to be affected by the legislation and most knowledgeable in the subject
matter, provide input to Congress before a congressional determination is made. 33
This view is bolstered by congressional webpages that list committees and their
areas of jurisdiction, congressional mailings touting a particular individual’s
different from fertilization and cloning and that Congress should consider removing
parthenogenesis from the Dickey-Wicker Amendment).
27
See id.
28
For the history and the description of the functions of the Congressional Budget
Office, see generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE (2012) [hereinafter INTRODUCTION], available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/
default/files/cbofiles/attachments/2012-IntroToCBO.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
29
See id. at 1–3.
30
See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (describing the notice-and-comment process within the
administrative agencies).
31
Schoolhouse Rock!: I’m Just a Bill (ABC television broadcast 1975), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FFroMQlKiag.
32
MR. SMITH GOES TO WASHINGTON (Columbia Pictures Corp. 1939).
33
See, e.g., Schoolhouse Rock!: I’m Just a Bill, supra note 31.
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membership on a certain committee that is supposedly relevant to the specific
concerns of the congressman’s district, and even C-SPAN programming that
shows committee hearings where congressmen and senators hear testimony and
question proponents and opponents of proposed bills. With such media
presentations, the public can be forgiven for thinking that each bill undergoes
serious scrutiny and debate before being voted on and enacted into law. The
reality, however, is quite different.
In the last few years, congressional hearings have often been called “Kabuki
theater” 34 or a “dog and pony show.” 35 While the moniker is most often applied to
the judicial confirmation hearings, 36 the same is true about all other hearings. 37 The
hearings are no longer designed to elicit unbiased expert testimony to aid the
deliberative process, but rather to provide support for preexisting political
viewpoints. 38 The appearance of witnesses in the congressional hearings is not a
matter of right for the public, but a matter of prerogative for committee chairs and
ranking members. 39 The chairman is a particularly powerful figure in the
committee with the authority to decide not only which proposals are considered
and in what order (or for that matter whether they are considered at all), but also
which witnesses he will call and to what they will testify. 40
The exercise of this power was on display when the late Senator Jesse Helms,
the then-Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, refused to hold
hearings on the nomination of William Weld to be the U.S. Ambassador to
34

See, e.g., Nelson Lund, Judicial Independence, Judicial Virtue, and the Political
Economy of the Constitution, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 59 (2012); Editorial, How
Conservative Is Judge Roberts?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at A30 (quoting then-Senator
Joe Biden describing the hearings as a “Kabuki dance”).
35
Indiana State Bar Association Conference on Relations Between Congress and the
Federal Courts: A Stenographic Record, 41 IND. L. REV. 305, 327 (2008) [hereinafter
Indiana State Bar] (“I find this for me more helpful than a congressional hearing and what
some would call a dog and pony show, which is what a lot of the hearings turn out to be.”)
(quoting Congressman Brad Ellsworth); Michael A. McCann, Antitrust, Governance, and
Postseason College Football, 52 B.C. L. REV. 517, 541 n.147 (2011) (describing some
congressional hearings on sports investigation as “dog-and-pony shows” created to attract
media attention).
36
See supra note 34.
37
See Indiana State Bar, supra note 35.
38
See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
39
Id.
40
Nathaniel O. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in
Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 344–45 n.99 (1998) (“Power is
particularly concentrated in the hands of committee chairs, who hold sway over the
committees’ agendas and the bills reported to the floor.”); see also Richard H. Pildes &
Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value
Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2137 (1990) (noting that
committee chairs control the agenda and that “[t]he rules for setting the agenda become a
powerful means for manipulating a divided legislature to converge on those outcomes
favored by the agenda setters”).
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Mexico. 41 When Senator Helms’s Republican colleagues rebelled against this
approach, Senator Helms was forced to hold a hearing. 42 However, at that hearing,
it was not Governor Weld who testified in support of his nomination. 43 Rather,
Senator Helms engaged in a soliloquy about the Senate traditions of allowing the
committee chairmen to refuse to bring up matters for hearings or votes and then
adjourned the hearing when he was done. 44
A committee chairman also has the authority to draft a bill on his own and
have that bill form the basis of discussions, rather than what may have been
debated in a subcommittee or during the initial hearings in the full committee.45
Thus, the chairman has a near complete control of the scope and substance of
discussion that takes place in the committee. 46
The modern absurdity of committee hearings is perhaps best illustrated by the
appearance of the comedian Stephen Colbert in front of the House Judiciary
Committee in September of 2010. 47 Mr. Colbert used the opportunity to mock
Congress and the process of considering bills. 48 Mr. Colbert, however, did not just
arrive at the hearing room unannounced. He was invited by the subcommittee
Chair, the long-serving Representative Zoe Lofgren. 49 Instead of a real debate on
the merits of the Farm Bill, the committee (and by extension, the public) was
treated to a mocking performance of a satirist. 50

41

Richard L. Berke & Steven Lee Myers, In Washington, Few Trifle with Jesse
Helms, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/08/02/us/in-washingtonfew-trifle-with-jesse-helms.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
42
Katharine Q. Seelye, With Iron Gavel, Helms Rejects Vote on Weld, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 1997, at A1.
43
Id.
44
Ultimately, Governor Weld was never brought up for a vote, and his nomination
was withdrawn. William Neikirk, Weld Whiffs on Helms Hardball, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 16,
1997, at 1.
45
See Glossary of Congressional Terms > C, THECAPITOL.NET, http://www.thecap
itol.net/glossary/c.htm#Chairman’sMark/Staff Draft (defining “Chairman’s Mark” as a
“[r]ecommendation by committee (or subcommittee) chair of the measure to be considered
in a markup, usually drafted as a bill”) (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
46
See supra note 40.
47
C-SPAN: Stephen Colbert’s Opening Statement (C-SPAN 3 television broadcast
Sept. 24, 2010), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k1T75jBYeCs.
48
See id.; see also Jonathan Allen, Colbert Knocks Dems Off Message, POLITICO.COM
(Sept. 24, 2010, 4:57 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0910/42692.html (“David
Corn, who writes for the liberal Mother Jones magazine, tweeted ‘Colbert is making a
mockery of this hearing.’ Republicans were more harsh.”).
49
Nicole Allan, Stephen Colbert Testifies in Congress, in Character, THE ATLANTIC
(Sept. 24, 2010, 12:07 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/09/stephencolbert-testifies-in-congress-in-character/63507/.
50
See Michael D. Shear & Ashley Parker, The Caucus; A Comic Twist On Political
Chatter, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2010, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950D
E1D71231F936A1575AC0A9669D8B63.
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What’s more, committee hearings are rarely fully attended by the committee
members. 51 In some ways, this is not surprising given that each member of
Congress serves on a number of committees. 52 The supposed deliberations then are
actually quite often just a show, with most of the work done not out in the open by
the people responsible to the electorate, but by the staffers.53 While staffers may
consult with experts in the field, 54 they need not do so, and even when they do
consult—because whatever advice is obtained comes through private
communications—there is little chance to test these communications against
criticism and opposing viewpoints. 55 Instead, the more likely outcome is epistemic
closure where the preplanned political outcome is justified by reference to
selective presentation of information and arguments. 56 Congressional committees
then are not the deliberative and fact-finding bodies portrayed in Schoolhouse
Rock videos, but rather are rubber-stamps for prewritten bills. Indeed courts have
often disregarded congressional findings of fact 57 precisely because quite often
51

Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-Finding,
84 IND. L.J. 1, 41 (2009) (“The very conduct of the committee hearings undermines any
serious examination of the facts; attendance is often poor, and during the testimony
legislators frequently talk to one another, wander in and out to take phone calls, and engage
in side conversations with their staff.”).
52
Marvin C. Ott, Partisanship and the Decline of Intelligence Oversight, 16 INT’L J.
INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 69, 87 (2003) (noting that members of Congress
“have multiple committee assignments and, under the best of circumstances, have difficulty
giving adequate time and attention to any one of them”).
53
See, e.g., William L. Andreen, Beyond Words of Exhortation: The Congressional
Prescription for Vigorous Federal Enforcement of the Clean Water Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 202, 237 (1987) (“The Committee, however, had not completed the final text of the
bill and left the task of drafting the appropriate language to its staff.”); Edward L. Rubin,
Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the Truth-in-Lending Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 233,
285 (1991) (“The drafting can be done by the legislator’s own staff, as Truth-in-Lending
was, or by a centralized staff of one kind or another, such as committee counsel, legislative
counsel, or a separate research office . . . .”).
54
See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, What Is This “Lobbying” That We Are So Worried
About?, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 552 (2008) (“Members of Congress and their staffs
are most vulnerable to the problematic methods because of their reliance on reelection, the
often temporary nature of their government service, and their ability to have closed door
meetings with lobbyists that protect the information they receive from outside scrutiny.”
(footnote omitted)); Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative
Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 584 (2002) (relating a
staffer’s experience of “reworking a long-pending constitutional amendment drafted in
consultation with legal scholars, policy experts, and representatives of law enforcement”).
55
See Neal Devins, Why Congress Did Not Think About the Constitution when
Enacting the Affordable Care Act, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 261, 266–67 (2012)
(noting that the minority party is often unable “to call witnesses or otherwise define the
hearing agenda”); Mayer, supra note 54, at 552.
56
See Mayer, supra note 54, at 552.
57
See, e.g., U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000) (rejecting Congress’s findings
of fact and noting that they “are substantially weakened by the fact that they rely so heavily
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these findings are tendentious, open to much dispute, and sometimes are not even
supported by actual evidence. 58
This situation would be bad enough, but that is merely the beginning of
failures in the legislative process. Several additional factors ensure the bills that
come up for votes on the floor of each house are not subject to full debate,
scrutiny, and relevant data. In the House of Representatives, before being reported
to the floor, each bill has to be considered and reported by the Committee on
Rules. 59 Whereas the various committees with subject matter jurisdiction are at
least nominally specialized—with representatives assigned based on specific
interest in the matters within committee’s jurisdiction and staffers being drawn
from the pool of individuals with specialized knowledge in these matters—the
Rules Committee is a purely political tool designed to allow the Speaker of the
House to keep control of the bills brought to the floor. 60 The Rules Committee’s
power over all bills is nearly limitless:
The [Rules] Committee has the authority to do virtually anything
during the course of consideration of a measure, including deeming it
passed. The Committee can also include a self-executed amendment
which could rewrite just parts of a bill, or the entire measure. In essence,
so long as a majority of the House is willing to vote for a special rule,
there is little that the Rules Committee cannot do. 61
Despite this power, the Committee does not spend much time considering the
bills that it reports to the floor. 62 Nor does it often hear outsiders’ testimony. 63
Instead, the individuals testifying before the Rules Committee are usually other
members of Congress that urge the committee to allow (or disallow) consideration
of certain amendments on the House floor. 64 Despite the lack of deep familiarity or
the factual background behind the bills, the Rules Committee can—and does—
rewrite bills it considers, even when such bills have been painstakingly developed

on a method of reasoning that we have already rejected as unworkable if we are to maintain
the Constitution’s enumeration of powers”).
58
See Borgmann, supra note 51, at 40.
59
See About the Committee on Rules—History and Processes, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, COMM. ON RULES, http://rules.house.gov/about (last visited Feb. 28,
2014).
60
See id.
61
Id.
62
See id.
63
See id. (“Rules Committee holds a hearing where the witnesses are the Members of
the House who sit on the committee of jurisdiction or want to offer amendments.”).
64
See id.
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in the committee of jurisdiction. 65 This makes the final product even less
deliberative and more political—in the worst sense of the word. 66
The Senate does not have a counterpart to the House Rules Committee.67
Nonetheless, the Senate has its own methods of skirting committees of jurisdiction.
The Senate majority leader controls the Senate’s calendar. 68 The majority leader
decides when to call up each bill, irrespective of whether it has been fully vetted
(or for that matter, vetted at all) by the committee of jurisdiction.69 In other words,
a bill can be written, introduced, and then immediately called up for consideration,
thus bypassing any hearings or opportunity—such as it is—for interested members
of the public to offer their views and criticism. 70 To be fair, the Senate rules do
allow senators to force extended—and nearly limitless—debate on any bill, thus
providing a bit of a safety check against bills being rushed through without due
consideration. 71 That said, the length of the debate and speechifying—often to an
otherwise empty chamber 72—does not necessarily enhance the quality of the
debate or allow experts, individuals, or groups most affected by the proposed
legislation to offer their views or describe the likely effect the proposed legislation
will have.
Related to the aforementioned problems is the fact that Congress has, over the
decades, blurred the traditional line between authorizing legislation and
65

See Gerald B.H. Solomon & Donald R. Wolfensberger, The Decline of Deliberative
Democracy in the House and Proposals for Reform, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 321, 358–63
(1993); U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMM. ON RULES, supra note 59.
66
See generally Solomon & Wolfensberger, supra note 65 (asserting that current
congressional policy-making practices are breaking down the basis of deliberative
democracy).
67
The Senate does have a Committee on Rules and Administration, but its jurisdiction
is significantly narrower than that of its House counterpart. The Senate Committee deals
only with the administration of the Senate itself, as well as bills on a specific and rather
limited basis. See About the Committee, COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., http://www.rules.sen
ate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=PurposeJurisdiction (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
68
VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT 96-548, THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS ON THE SENATE FLOOR: AN INTRODUCTION 5 (2013), available at
http://www.senate.gov/CRSReports/crs-publish.cfm?pid=%26*2D4Q%5CK3%0A (“The
Senate gives its majority leader the primary responsibility for deciding the order in which
bills on the calendar should come to the floor for action.”).
69
Id. at 6.
70
Id. (noting that Senate Rule XIV allows any senator to bypass referral to
committee, but because the majority leader controls the calendar, that power is only
effective with respect to the bills that the majority leader wishes to have debated on the
floor).
71
See Standing Rules of the Senate r. XXII, in COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., SENATE
MANUAL, S. Doc. No. 112-1, r. XXII, at 1, 20–22 (2011). This is the rule that permits the
process known as filibuster as it allows the debate to be shut off only if three-fifths of the
elected senators vote to end debate. Id.
72
See Stuart Banner, Trials and Other Entertainment, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1285,
1288 (2011) (“On C-Span today, you can watch politicians giving speeches before what
look like completely empty chambers.”).
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appropriating legislation. Professor Richard Lazarus describes the distinction
between the two types of bills and the consequences that flow from each:
The decision whether to pass authorizing legislation, such as the
Clean Air Act, its detailed amendments, or any other kind of
substantive legislation, is almost always entirely discretionary.
Because relatively few federal statutes . . . have sunset provisions,
congressional failure to pass a new authorization statute preserves
the status quo. The absence of legislative action does not create a
disruptive legal vacuum. Congress need not formally reauthorize
either the Clean Water Act or the Clean Air Act after a statutorily
prescribed number of years for those laws to remain in effect.
Hence, those seeking to pass a new authorization statute invariably
face the heavy burden of demonstrating why a change is
necessary.
Precisely the converse is true when appropriations legislation
is at stake. There is enormous political pressure to pass annual
appropriations legislation because, absent its passage, the status
quo is not maintained. Instead, there is a very real threat of a
complete shutdown of the federal government. If the deadline for
the annual appropriations bill is not met, then to avoid a shutdown
Congress must at a minimum pass a continuing resolution to
appropriate funds for a few more weeks or months as necessary to
keep an agency in operation until passage of the annual
appropriations bill. 73
As a result of the “must-pass” nature of the appropriation bills, “it is tempting
to try to attach incidental provisions that otherwise might lack the political
momentum (or even majority support) necessary for passage.” 74 These riders can
often be no different than stand-alone “substantive” bills, but because they are
attached to appropriation bills, rather than authorization legislation, they are not
considered in the committee of jurisdiction over the substantive matter. If they are
considered in the committee at all, it is in the Committee on Appropriations. 75
Quite often, these riders are not even considered in the Appropriations Committee,
but rather are added last minute during the floor debates and votes. 76 Again, in
either case, the legislators are deprived of the considered views of those whom the
legislation is likely to affect. 77
73

Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative
Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 634–35 (2006).
74
Id. at 635.
75
See id. at 636. Of course, any rider that is part of the annual appropriations bill
would expire at the same time as the underlying bill would. Thus, such riders would have
to be renewed from year to year if they are to continue in force.
76
See id. at 648–53.
77
See id.
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A final stage at which bills can be amended without much public input or
debate is a conference committee formed to negotiate over different versions of a
bill passed by the House and the Senate. 78 Much like the House of
Representative’s Committee on Rules, conference committees have an almost
unlimited authority to rewrite or modify a pending bill, 79 and they can do so in
near-total secrecy, 80 for meetings of conference committees are generally not open
to the public, at least not for the purposes of giving testimony and illuminating the
full scope of effects that the bill (or any modifications thereto) would have. 81
In short, the informed, deliberative process that the public is taught to expect
is quite often anything but that. Instead, the process is often much more haphazard,
ill-informed, and subject to hijacking by individuals who may not understand the
full impact of the very legislation for which they support and vote. Furthermore,
the current process allows congressmen to obscure and obfuscate politically
inconvenient facts. By refusing to bring forth witnesses, Congress can create
legislative history that is willfully barren of countervailing facts. In those
situations, the problem is not that congressmen do not understand the implications
of the legislation, but that they willfully refuse to acknowledge those implications.
This degradation of the deliberative process has several effects. It results in
legislators being presented with limited and incomplete information and,
consequently, congressmen voting on bills without fully realizing the downside of
their votes. These votes may well be cast differently if information presented were

78

See THECAPITOL.NET, supra note 45 (“A temporary, ad hoc panel composed of
House and Senate conferees that is formed for the purpose of reconciling differences in
legislation that has passed both chambers.”).
79
See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, Things Fall Apart: A Constitutional Analysis of
Legislative Exclusion, 55 EMORY L.J. 1, 11–12 (2006) (describing how a conference
committee rewrote the 2003 Medicare bills, including reinserting the language previously
rejected in floor votes); Victor M. Sher & Carol Sue Hunting, Eroding the Landscape,
Eroding the Laws: Congressional Exemptions from Judicial Review of Environmental
Laws, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 435, 443–44 (1991) (“The bill went to the Senate
Appropriations Energy-Water Subcommittee, where the second Tennessee senator, Jim
Sasser, left the language intact. The full Senate voted to remove Duncan’s language from
the bill, but after the conference committee concluded, the bill returned to the Senate with
the Tellico exemption again present. The senators, now weary of the issue, voted to allow
the dam to be completed.” (footnotes omitted)).
80
See, e.g., id. at 11 (describing that the conference committee excluded not only the
public, but even members of Congress with opposing viewpoints); Jameel Jaffer, Secret
Evidence in the Investigative Stage: FISA, Administrative Subpoenas, and Privacy, 5
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 7, 15 (2006) (“The conference committee . . .
[dealing with a Patriot Act reauthorization] met only once, and only so that members could
deliver opening statements. ‘The rest of the work of the conference committee consists of
Republican staff working behind the scenes to draft a compromise bill. . . . That is to say
that the Republican staff of the Senate negotiated with the Republican staff of the House.’”
(quoting Rep. Jerry Nadler)).
81
See, e.g., Sher & Hunting, supra note 79, at 477–78.
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more complete. 82 That said, the linkage is not always true. It may well be that
congressmen would vote the same way no matter how much information were
available and how many people testified in front of their committee. Congressmen
may aim to please their political supporters and discount the costs that such
legislation may impose on the rest of society. 83 Additional information or
broadening the spectrum of participants in the legislative process is unlikely to
change legislators’ basic incentives. 84 What additional information may do,
however, is focus congressmen’s attention on the broader effect that the legislation
will have, beyond merely pleasing political allies. Once such effects are brought
into focus, congressmen at least would have to justify their decision to ignore these
effects, while the electorate will be able to pass judgment on whether such
justifications withstand scrutiny. The next Part provides a glaring example of how
these problems affect legislation and cause injury to the progress of science.
III. THE DICKEY-WICKER AMENDMENT
A. The Amendment and Its History
The above discussion is not meant to suggest that the legislative process is
either irreparably broken or that the process itself is worthless. Indeed, with respect
to most matters addressed by the legislature, the legislative process works the way
it is intended to. Much of what Congress does centers on value judgments about
the appropriate role of government, level of taxation, proper foreign policy, etc. 85

82

See Kenneth C. Smurzynski, Modeling Campaign Contributions: The Market for
Access and Its Implications for Regulation, 80 GEO. L.J. 1891, 1899 (1992).
83
See Lindsay Warren Bowen, Jr., Note, Givings and the Next Copyright Deferment,
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 809, 821 (2008) (discussing Congress’s response to “small,
politically powerful group of copyright holders,” despite the fact that such a response
“harms society by allowing copyright holders to charge artificially high prices and by
restraining the creation of new works based on copyrighted material”); Thomas O.
Sargentich, The Future of the Item Veto, 83 IOWA L. REV. 79, 122 (1997) (“The electoral
system is often singled out as the key source of relevant institutional incentives for
politicians, given the assumption that the President and members of Congress will
inevitably seek to reward the constituencies that elected them. . . . The pressure on
members of Congress is particularly intense when the benefits of a governmental policy are
concentrated and the costs are spread widely among members of the public, for in such
cases, private interests have a strong motivation to organize to seek benefits.”).
84
See Sargentich, supra note 83, at 122 (noting that because of reelection concerns,
“members of Congress will inevitably seek to reward the constituencies that elected
them”).
85
George Jiang, Rain or Shine: Fair and Other Non-Infringing Uses in the Context of
Cloud Computing, 36 J. LEGIS. 395, 395 (2010) (“[E]very statute encapsulates legislative
value judgments regarding foreseeable situations at the time of enactment.”); see also Dr.
Anja Seibert-Fohr, The Rise of Equality in International Law and its Pitfalls: Learning
from Comparative Constitutional Law, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 38 (2010) (“Whether
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In those circumstances, congressional majorities are primarily concerned with
building public support for their proposed public policy solutions. 86 In that posture,
the “dog and pony” congressional hearings make perfect sense. The hearings there
are not meant to illuminate the issues for debate, but rather to bolster the political
support for (or to drum up opposition to) a preformulated political position. 87
Congress, in making its decisions, does have to rely on its understanding of
the facts as they exist in the real world. When the facts are common or undisputed
knowledge (e.g., the distance between two cities, the number of days in a year, or
the revenues and expenditures of the government in the years past), there is not
much danger that Congress will misunderstand the content, scope, or the import of
the factual basis (though, of course, it may choose to assign whatever weight it
chooses to these facts). However, when the facts concern complicated scientific
issues requiring specialized knowledge for full comprehension, congressmen,
usually untrained in science, are unlikely to fully understand either the predicate
for their actions or the full effect that the actions will have. 88 As a result, Congress
often enacts laws that have a devastating effect on the speed and scope of scientific
progress. It does so not out of any malice for scientific advances, but out of
misunderstanding of the issues.
The Dickey-Wicker Amendment (“DWA”) 89 is a perfect example of Congress
acting without understanding the full effect that the legislation would have on
scientific exploration. Since 1974, federal law had already imposed restrictions on
the use of federal funds with respect to fetal research. 90 Those restrictions have
been part and parcel of the abortion debate and legislative skirmishes. 91 In the
legislation is generally reasonable largely depends on value judgments that vary from
nation to nation.”).
86
See, e.g., Joseph A. Castelluccio III, Sarbanes-Oxley and Small Business: Section
404 and the Case for a Small Business Exemption, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 429, 435–36 (2005)
(“In order to enact effective securities regulation on the federal level, the Pecora Hearings
sought to ‘galvanize[] broad public support for direct federal regulation of the stock
markets.’” (alteration in original) (quoting JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN
CORPORATE FINANCE 2 (3d ed. 2003)).
87
See Castelluccio III, supra note 86, at 436.
88
See, e.g., Alfred J. Cote, Jr., Who Tells Congress About Technology?, INDUS.
RESEARCH, Sept. 1967, at 78, 80 (noting that scientists are “unable to translate their ideas
into language that Congressmen understand”).
89
Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 128, 110 Stat. 26, 34 (1996).
90
See Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, § 213, 88 Stat. 342, 353 (1974)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. 289I-1 (1978), repealed by Community Mental Health Centers
Extension Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-622, § 302(b), 92 Stat. 3442 (1978) (limiting fetal
research by prohibiting support for research on a living human fetus unless done for the
survival of the fetus).
91
See Gary L. Reback, Fetal Experimentation: Moral, Legal, and Medical
Implications, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1191, 1207 (1974) (“Roe produced a rash of hastily
prepared . . . statutes designed to prohibit the same type of fetal experimentation that had
occurred prior to recent liberalized abortion laws.”).
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1990s, however, as scientific horizons began to expand and the research began to
focus on the earliest stages of human development, the ethical and political
concerns over such research began to extend not just to fetal tissue, but also to
embryonic tissue. The issue was studied by the National Institute of Health’s
(“NIH”) Human Embryo Research Panel, composed of nineteen leading scientists
and ethicists. 92 The panel issued its report on September 27, 1994, and
recommended making federal funding available for research using “spare”
embryos, embryos obtained from consenting IVF patients, embryos created
specifically for research, and research using parthenotes. 93 This Part discusses the
science of parthenotes and why the distinction is important, despite being
overlooked by Congress. President Clinton declined to follow the recommendation
in full, and under the executive order issued in 1994, federal funding was not made
available for embryos created specifically for research. 94 What is interesting about
President Clinton’s executive order was that it was made after a period of study,
comments, and a report by a body of experts. 95 Nevertheless, the fact that the
President did not fully endorse the recommendations of the expert panel does not
diminish the importance of having had the benefit of the expert input.
Congress, however, was not satisfied with President Clinton’s compromise. In
response, in 1996, it enacted the DWA. 96 The DWA prohibited funding for any
research that involved “(1) the creation of a human embryo or embryos for
research purposes; or (2) research in which a human embryo or embryos are
destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death . . . .” 97 The
DWA defined “human embryo” as “any organism . . . that is derived by
fertilization, parthenogenesis, cloning, or any other means from one or more
human gametes.” 98 Although Congress, like the President, had access to the NIH
92

See NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH PANEL,
at vii–viii (1994), available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/past_commissi
ons/human_embryo_vol_1.pdf.
93
Id. at xviii–xix.
94
Debora Spar & Anna Harrington, Selling Stem Cell Science: How Markets Drive
Law along the Technological Frontier, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 541, 556 (2007) (“On the very
same day that the NIH approved the report, however, President Clinton issued an executive
order forbidding the use of federal funds for embryo research in which embryos were
created or destroyed.”).
95
Id.
96
See Rodriguez et al., supra note 26, at 24–25 (“The momentum for a more inclusive
ban, however, began a month earlier, when, in the 1994 elections, Republicans regained
control of both Congressional houses. For many of those elected, Clinton’s prohibition was
not enough.”).
97
Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 128, 110 Stat. 26, 34
(1996); see also Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 509, 123 Stat.
524, 803 (prohibiting use of funds available under this appropriations act for the same
purposes); Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. 109-149, § 509, 119 Stat. 2833, 2880 (2005).
98
Balanced Budget Downpayment Act § 128; see also Omnibus Appropriations Act
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 509, 123 Stat. 524, 803 (including the “human diploid cells”
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Report, there is no evidence that it ever considered the findings of the report or the
distinctions drawn therein. The reason is that the DWA, because it was a “rider” on
a must-pass appropriations bill, 99 was never debated in any committee or on the
floor. Instead, it was attached to a bill that resolved the “longest federal
government shutdown in American history.” 100 The entire Act was introduced,
debated, and voted on in the House of Representatives in fewer than two and a half
hours. 101 The Senate considered the entirety of the bill, including three separate
amendments (none of which dealt with embryonic research) and voted on it the
next day. 102 President Clinton signed it immediately upon the Senate’s passage. 103
This legislative rider has been reenacted every year since. 104 As with the initial
enactment, there is no evidence that the amendment was ever debated in any
committee or on the floor of either house.
The DWA and its restrictions became particularly salient in 1998 with the
discovery of a successful method to isolate and grow human embryonic stem cells
using cell culture. 105 Embryonic stem cells are a potential treasure trove of future
research and treatment. 106 Three different presidents have had to issue
contradictory statements on NIH funding of such research.107 The most recent NIH

language); Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. 109-149, § 509, 119 Stat. 2833, 2880 (2005)
(inserting the language “human diploid cells” after “human gametes”).
99
See Omnibus FY96 Bill Ties Loose Ends, supra note 23, 10-19.
100
See Rodriguez et al., supra note 26, at 25 (discussing the attachment of the DWA
to the LHHS budget stalls).
101
See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 25.
102
See id.
103
Id.
104
Kiyan Bigloo, Aggregation of Powers: Stem Cell Research and the Scope of
Presidential Power Examined Through the Lens of Executive Order Jurisprudence, 18
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y. & L. 519, 523 (2012).
105
See John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics, 29 AM. J. L. &
MED. 439, 483 (2003) (“The right-to-life versus scientific research fault-line surfaced again
in debates over federal funding of embryonic stem cell research. That debate began in 1998
when researchers at Johns Hopkins University and the University of Wisconsin developed
ways to culture human embryonic stem cells indefinitely in the laboratory, opening the
door to directing them to produce replacement tissue to treat disease.”).
106
See id.; Shannon McGuire, Embryonic Stem Cells: Marrow of the Dickey Matter,
11 J. HIGH TECH. L. 160, 160 (2010) (discussing the therapeutic potential of human
embryonic stem cells).
107
Compare Presidential Statement on Federal Funding of Research on Human
Embryos, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2459 (Dec. 2, 1994) (statement by President
Clinton refusing to allocate federal funds “to support the creation of human embryos for
research purposes”), with Presidential Address to the Nation on Stem Cell Research from
Crawford, Texas, 37 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1149, 1151 (Aug. 9, 2001) (statement by
President Bush allocating funds for limited human embryo research), and Exec. Order No.
13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,667 (2009) (President Obama’s order to remove restrictions and
expand federal funding for embryo research).
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policy, one enacted pursuant to President Obama’s executive order, 108 has been
challenged in courts as contravening DWA’s clear statutory language. 109 The D.C.
Circuit disagreed that the language was sufficiently clear to allow only one
interpretation, thus permitting the challenged regulations to stand. 110 The point is
that because Congress never debated the DWA, it has never made a record as to
what evils it was meant to prevent, leaving each administration somewhat free to
adopt broad or narrow interpretation of the law and to fund or not fund various
research projects. This, of course, is highly detrimental to the scientific
community, which, as a result, is plagued by uncertainty over whether research
will continue to be funded or whether the change in administration will result in a
funding cutoff. With scientific progress dependent on long-term research projects,
this state of affairs is hardly ideal.
B. The Science of Parthenotes
The DWA is part of the perennial fight and debate over abortion and the
question of when life actually begins. 111 To be sure, these are not scientific issues
and are not amenable to any falsifiable experimentation.112 As the U.S. Supreme
Court pointed out, even “those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine,
philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus” as to when life
begins. 113 In that sense, the DWA’s effect on science and scientific exploration is
secondary to its proponents. 114 Nonetheless, even those who espouse the view that
life begins at conception and merits protection from that point in time do not
generally take the view that research on any cell that contains the full complement
of human chromosomes is improper. 115 Indeed, opponents of abortion and
embryonic research often tout research on human nonembryonic cells as a viable
108

Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,667 (2009).
Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 393–94 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
110
Id. at 390, 396–97.
111
See June Mary Zekan Makdisi, The Slide from Human Embryonic Stem Cell
Research to Reproductive Cloning: Ethical Decision-Making and the Ban on Federal
Funding, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 463, 475–78 (2003) (discussing the enactment of the DickeyWicker Amendment as part of the effort to “to uphold the sanctity and intrinsic value of
life, and to prevent the dehumanization and commodification of human life”).
112
See Lauren R. Robbins, Open Your Mouth and Say ‘Ideology’: Physicians and the
First Amendment, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 183–86 (2009) (discussing lack of scientific
consensus on the question of when life begins).
113
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
114
See Makdisi, supra note 111, at 475 (“Congress voiced its response as a rider to
the appropriations bill and made it clear that beneficence to the embryo rather than utility
to the populace should be the governing value.”).
115
See, e.g., Gregory Dolin, A Defense of Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 84 IND. L.J.
1203, 1210 n.56 (2009) (discussing the support of various religious groups for adult stem
cell research); James J. McCartney, Embryonic Stem Cell Research and Respect for Human
Life: Philosophical and Legal Reflections, 65 ALB. L. REV. 597, 623–24 (2002) (noting that
there is “little ethical debate” about the use of adult stem cells).
109
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alternative to embryonic research. 116 The reason for treating embryos (even single
cell ones) differently from other cells with full chromosomal complement is the
notion that embryos, given enough time and the right environment, can develop
into full adult human organism, whereas other cells cannot do so. It is for this
reason that the two sets of cells that would otherwise look nearly identical under
the microscope are accorded a different moral status.117 The moral and
philosophical aspects of this valuation, however, are undergirded by a purely
factual scientific inquiry: Can this particular cell develop into an adult human
organism? If so, then, and only then, does it stand on a higher moral plane. 118
Thus, in order to make that judgment, an individual needs to be familiar with the
answers to certain basic scientific questions. Unfortunately, the Congress that
enacted the DWA (and subsequent Congresses) never considered this issue when
they enacted the broad funding prohibition that covered research on parthenotes. 119
Had Congress understood the nature and the science of parthenotes and
parthenogenesis, the scope of the DWA may have well been narrower, and the
effect on scientific exploration less pronounced.
Parthenogenesis is a portmanteau 120 derived from Greek parthenos, meaning
virgin, and genesis, meaning birth. 121 The term is used to denote asexual
reproduction. 122 Unlike sexual reproduction that involves the contribution of
genetic materials from both an egg and a sperm, parthenogenesis involves
contribution from the egg only. 123 This form of reproduction is naturally occurring
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and is common to a number of invertebrate species. 124 It is also present in all
classes of vertebrates, excepting mammals. 125 In nonmammals, this form of
reproduction “can occur spontaneously (i.e., naturally) as a continuous
reproductive strategy or as a response to environmental or nutritional changes.” 126
In mammals (of which humans are, of course, part), spontaneous parthenogenesis
cannot result in a viable full-term offspring because this form of reproduction has
been, evolutionary speaking, abandoned. 127 Instead, when mammalian ova get
spontaneously activated, they result not in an offspring, but in an ovarian tumor. 128
Thus, spontaneous parthenogenesis can occur in humans, but it is not a genesis or
birth of a new life, but rather of cancerous lesions. 129
Parthenotes (defined as ova activated via parthenogenesis) also can be created
in vitro “through chemical stimuli that mimic fertilization, but the lack of required
genetic imprinting rules out further development.” 130 These “activated” ova begin
to divide as if they were fertilized, but the division is halted at an early stage of cell
differentiation, eventually resulting in the death of the parthenote. 131 Thus, human
parthenotes, whether created spontaneously in vivo or during the course of an
experiment in vitro, intrinsically are incapable of becoming viable human
embryos. 132 Their potential for developing into an adult organism is no greater than
the potential of an unfertilized egg or a tumor cell. Yet, despite this obvious
difference between parthenotes and embryos, the DWA treats them as one and the
same, and it does so without anyone in Congress ever explicitly considering this
difference. 133
While parthenotes are not a perfect research substitute for embryos, they do
have their valuable uses. First, because parthenotes do involve the initial activation
of an ovum, they can be used to study the early stages of pregnancy and embryonic
development. 134 For instance, it has been reported that implantation of fertilized
eggs as part of Assisted Reproductive Technology (“ART”) processes often fail
because the egg activation process does not function properly. 135 Studying the
intricacies of that process would help perfect ART processes and ultimately lead to
higher rate of success with in vitro fertilization and, therefore, less abandoned or
“spare” embryos. 136
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Second, parthenotes are useful in studying miscarriages. 137 Some research
suggests that many miscarriages are due to the “very early loss of nonviable
parthenotes caused by spontaneous egg activation in the female.” 138 Identifying a
biological marker that differentiates parthenotes from fertilized ova would help
study the causes of miscarriage. 139
Third, parthenotes are useful in studying certain tumors. 140 As mentioned
previously, in mammals, spontaneous in vivo parthenogenesis leads not to an
offspring, but to a gonadal tumor. 141 Despite tremendous advances in knowledge
about cancer causes and treatments, it is still one of the most complicated diseases
from the viewpoint of its etiology, diagnosis, and progression, as well as its
treatment. 142 Any advances in understanding cancer processes, its diagnosis, and
treatment would be valuable for the preservation of both extant human life, as well
as potential human life, by helping to preserve fertility in the affected population.
Finally, parthenotes may serve as a source of stem cells akin to those
extracted from embryos. 143 It is generally believed that stem cell research can lead
to breakthrough advances in the understanding and treatment of spinal cord
injuries, Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson disease, and a number of other
ailments. 144 Whereas extraction of embryonic stem cells generally involves
destroying an embryo, thus raising the concerns about the destruction of potential
viable human life,145 extraction of similar stem cells from parthenotes avoids these
concerns because, as discussed previously, human parthenotes are never viable and
will not, under any circumstances, develop into an adult human. 146 Thus,
parthenotes can be a point of compromise between proponents of full federal
funding for embryonic stem cell research and opponents of such funding.
All of these advances are now precluded because of the broad language of the
Dickey-Wicker Amendment—a provision that was enacted with no debate and no
understanding of the crucial biological differences between embryos and
parthenotes.
This Article does not take a specific position on the propriety of embryonic or
parthenote research147 because the ultimate outcome of legislative debate is not
where the problem lies. After all, on any contentious issue, after the votes are
137
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counted, one side has to win, and the other has to lose. That has to happen even if
there has been the most exhaustive and informative of debates. The point is not
that the decision on the DWA necessarily should have been different either in
whole or in part. It may very well be that even after hearing all of the arguments
and scientific data differentiating parthenotes from embryos, Congress still would
have enacted the DWA in its present form. One reason Congress could have done
so is to create a “fence of protection” around human life, much like Talmudic
scholars impose requirements on observant Jews that go beyond the bare minimum
commands of the Torah, so as to make sure that the actual precepts are not
violated. 148 Second, it is quite possible that even given an identical set of facts,
people of different political and religious persuasions, after viewing the facts
through their own lens, will come to radically different conclusions as to what is
the “right solution” 149 and, therefore, choose not to fund parthenotes research.
Third, it may well be that the political incentives of the DWA’s proponents are
such that they weigh heavily towards voting for the broadest possible ban
irrespective of the cost imposed on scientific progress. 150
Ultimately, what form a decision on the DWA would have taken and whether
such decision would have been a good one from the perspective of public policy is
not what concerns me. Rather, my argument is that the decision, whatever it is,
must be made after the legislators are fully apprised of the scientific underpinnings
of their proposals and the likely effect that the proposal would have on the progress
of sciences. In this way, congressmen would understand the full implication of
their actions, and the public would be able to judge those actions against the
complete set of facts. The next Part suggests how to ensure that this informational
and deliberative part of the decision-making process actually occurs.
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IV. THE CONGRESSIONAL SCIENCE OFFICE AND LEGISLATIVE NOTICE AND
COMMENT PROCESS
A. The Congressional Science Office
As Part II previously discussed, there are three distinct, major problems with
congressional decision making, especially when it affects science. First, there is a
lack of an independent, nonpartisan forum for discussing and evaluating proposals.
Second, there is a lack of sufficient training in the subject matter of proposals to
fully understand their scope; and third, there is no meaningful ability for the public
to contribute to the debate and discussion of the proposals. Thus, any system
designed to fix the current flaws would necessarily have to address each of these
shortcomings. Luckily, there are systems currently in place that can be used as
models for addressing the shortcomings in congressional deliberations when it
comes to scientific issues. Specifically, the role and function of the Congressional
Budget Office is a useful point of departure in creating a nonpartisan body of
experts to advise Congress on specific and technical matters for which
congressmen themselves may not have full appreciation.
The Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) was created in 1974 by the
Congressional Budget Act to provide “independent analyses of budgetary and
economic issues to support the Congressional budget process. The agency is
strictly nonpartisan and conducts objective, impartial analysis . . . .” 151 The CBO
“produce[s] a formal cost estimate for nearly every bill that is ‘reported’
(approved) by a full committee of either House of Congress . . . .” 152 The CBO also
provides an annual report called “Budget and Economic Outlook,” which “includes
projections of spending and revenues under current law over the next 10 years as
well as an economic forecast . . . .” 153 Thus, the CBO evaluates not only likely
prospective effects of proposed legislation, but also yearly reevaluates the effect of
current policy and estimates the effect of these policies if they are continued. 154
Finally, the CBO “prepares analytic reports at the request of the Congressional
leadership or Chairmen or Ranking Minority Members of committees or
subcommittees.” 155 These reports analyze proposals that may or may not be in a
form of a formal bill or amendment but help congressmen evaluate ideas that are
being discussed either formally or informally. 156
In producing its reports, the CBO relies on the internal government data
available from agencies like the Census Bureau, Federal Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Justice Statistics, etc. 157
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Government agencies, however, are not the sole source of information for the
CBO. A particularly interesting aspect of CBO’s operation is that it “seeks input
from outside experts, including professors, analysts at think tanks, private-sector
experts, and employees at various government agencies.” 158 This input
“complement[s] the knowledge and insights of . . . the agency’s staff.” 159
The CBO reports are not “binding” on Congress in a sense that an unfavorable
CBO “score” (i.e., a report that projects that a given proposal would increase the
deficit) does not preclude Congress from adopting the proposed bill. 160 Indeed,
Congress often votes to enact bills that increase the deficit. 161 Nonetheless, the
CBO reports are discussed during the committee and floor debates, as well as
during election campaigns. 162 As a result, the politicians, even when they
ultimately decide to enact a law that is unfavorably scored by the CBO, must take
that score into account and come up with coherent arguments as to why they voted
the way they did. 163
Though there has been some criticism of the CBO’s methods, 164 the CBO is
generally viewed as a nonpartisan body, not beholden to either political party. 165
Indeed, despite the criticism leveled at the CBO, it is generally viewed as a neutral
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arbiter of budgetary disputes 166 (even if certain political actors disagree with the
underlying methodology). 167 The CBO’s estimates are often the centerpiece of
political and campaign debates, and members of both parties rely on them to tout
their own agenda or to criticize their opponents’ plans. 168 The CBO ensures that it
remains a neutral arbiter (and is perceived as such) by limiting the political
activities of its staff, 169 requiring that the Speaker of the House and President pro
tempore of the Senate appoint the Director of the Office after consultations with
the members of the committees having jurisdiction over the budgetary matters, 170
giving the Director a fixed four-year term (irrespective of the political vicissitudes
of the individuals originally responsible for the Director’s appointment), 171 and
seeking input from a variety of outside experts. 172 Additionally, and perhaps most
importantly, the CBO makes no policy recommendations to Congress. 173 Instead,
the CBO’s role is limited to evaluating and scoring congressional policy
proposals. 174
The CBO model is a good starting point for the creation of a system that
would illuminate and evaluate congressional proposals that would have an effect
on the progress of sciences. If Congress had a Congressional Science Office with a
mission similar to that of a CBO, except on matters of science, the debates over
legislation having impact on scientific progress would be better informed and more
substantive. Indeed, there used to exist a similar congressional office. From 1972
to 1995, the Office of Technology Assessment (“OTA”) produced studies on a
wide range of topics from acid rain, to payment for physician services, to wood
use. 175 The new Republican majority abolished the OTA in 1995 as part of the
166
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Contract with America. 176 The abolition of the office was criticized at the time, 177
and there have been calls to resurrect it. 178 A resurrected OTA would indeed be a
good point of departure. However, the “new OTA,” or Congressional Science
Office (“CSO”), should have a somewhat different mission from the original OTA.
The original Office prepared reports on scientific issues of the day but without
being tied to any specific legislation. 179 Such reports are certainly useful as
background information and as prods for Congress to act on issues that they might
not have otherwise considered. Nonetheless, for individuals lacking scientific or
technical training (like most congressmen), 180 applying the background
information to the specific legislative proposals is often just as difficult as
acquiring the background knowledge in the first place. 181 For that reason, the recreated office would be more effective if its reports were directed to specific
legislative proposals, rather than general scientific issues that may be of interest to
Congress and the country. On a related note, an office that chooses on its own
which subject matters to report is more open to the accusation of political bias. 182
Even when the science found in the report is sound and the conclusions drawn are
true, the very act of selecting on which topics to report—and, therefore, highlight
in the public’s mind—and which to omit may create an impression that certain
issues are being given more importance for political reasons. 183 That is especially
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true when the issues are fairly politically sensitive. 184 On the other hand, when the
CSO reports on every bill that has passed the committee of jurisdiction, as well as
on any requests that are made of it by the Chairman and the Ranking Member of
relevant committees, the CSO itself cannot be accused of picking and choosing
which issues to highlight. Instead, they merely would be a responsive body,
helping Congress understand both the scientific background in the relevant area
and the likely impact of the proposed legislation. It would, however, remain
entirely up to Congress whether and how much weight to give to these reports.
What Congress would not be able to avoid is the debate over the actual merits of
the proposed legislation, either in the halls of Congress or on the campaign trail.
Additionally, the CSO—much like the CBO—would report not only on
pending bills, but also provide a year-end report on how the bills previously
enacted have actually worked in the real world. Educated predictions as to the
effect that legislation will have are certainly a valuable tool for legislators to
decide how to vote on a pending bill, but reporting and evaluating actual effects
will help legislators decide whether to renew expiring legislation and will also
serve as an annual self-check on the CSO itself. By cross-checking its predictions
with actual outcomes, the CSO will be better able to fine-tune its evaluative
function and insulate itself from any charges of partisanship.
B. The Legislative Notice and Comment Process
The creation of a Congressional Science Office, charged with evaluating
proposed legislation for impact on science in the same manner that the CBO
evaluates proposed legislation for its impact on the budget, would solve the first
problem with current congressional decision making in the scientific arena: the
lack of an independent, nonpartisan forum for discussing and evaluating proposals.
However, two additional problems would remain—the lack of sufficient training in
the subject matter of proposals to fully understand their scope 185 and the lack of
meaningful ability for the public to contribute to the debate and discussion of the
proposals. 186 Of course, the staff of the CSO would have to have scientific,
technical, or engineering training—much like the staff of the CBO must have
training in economics. However, with scientific knowledge proliferating and
progressing at an incredible pace, it would be quite hard to hire enough people to
cover all possible fields of scientific exploration. Even if such coverage were
possible, it is likely that the knowledge of the Office’s staff would grow stale with
time.
Thus, the mere existence of the CSO and quality staff, while going a long way
to improving the understanding of the scope and effect of the legislative proposals,
would still be insufficient to keep up with the emerging or rapidly changing
184
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technologies. The CSO would have to look beyond its own internal expertise. This
Article has already discussed that the CBO does just that by seeking input of
independent experts of various political stripes in making its projections. 187 While
that approach is laudable, it is not sufficient in the context of evaluating the impact
of legislation on scientific progress. Furthermore, if the CSO were able to pick its
own experts—especially on highly charged issues (e.g., embryonic research, global
warming, human subject research, etc.)—it could be open to the accusation of bias
in its selection. 188 If such an outcome were to come to pass, it would undermine the
legitimacy of the CSO and its evaluations. Thus, in my view, the participation in
evaluating the impact of proposed legislation on matters of science should be
broader. Broader engagement would also address the current lack of meaningful
opportunity for the public to participate in the shaping of legislative decisions. The
question is how does one achieve broad participation that results in informative
and valuable input into the ultimate product—the CSO’s formal evaluation of
legislative proposals?
One way to involve the interested and informed public in crafting legal
language has been successfully tried in the administrative arena. The
Administrative Procedures Act of 1946 (“APA”) 189 required agencies to give
notice to the public on proposed rules, to allow the public to comment on the
proposal, and to consider the comments before issuing a final rule. “[N]otice-andcomment rulemaking provides several interrelated benefits. It allows all
stakeholders in a regulatory decision to be heard before a decision is made and
ensures that the agency responds to relevant comments.” 190 As the Fourth Circuit
very recently pointed out,
The important purposes of this notice and comment
procedure cannot be overstated. The agency benefits from the
experience and input of comments by the public, which help
ensure informed agency decisionmaking. The notice and comment
procedure also is designed to encourage public participation in the
administrative process. Additionally, the process helps ensure that
the agency maintains a flexible and open-minded attitude towards
its own rules, because the opportunity to comment must be a
meaningful opportunity. 191
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The agency, of course, “need not respond to every comment so long as it
responds in a reasoned manner to significant comments received.” 192 In other
words, the agency must simply show that it has considered the views of the public
and came to a reasoned decision, even if that decision is contrary to views
expressed in the comments. 193 This process has been found to be so successful that
there have been calls to export it beyond America’s borders. 194 However, the
successes of the notice-and-comment procedure can be applied on the home front
as well by transplanting it to the legislative arena.
Once a bill or proposal is referred to the CSO for an evaluation and report, the
CSO would identify provisions that would potentially have an impact on scientific
progress. It would then invite public comments on those provisions. Those most
familiar with the underlying science, as well as the likely effect that the proposed
legislation will have on the research in the field, would be able to convey their
understanding to the CSO via a formal comment. Furthermore, because the
comments would be open to the public at large (and not just to select scientists),
comments would also be made centering on ethical implications of the legislative
enactments or the research itself. In that way, the CSO would be able to present a
full range of views of the scientific community, including any concerns raised
about the propriety of certain methods and avenues of research. The CSO would
serve as an aggregator and a filter for this commentary by evaluating, compiling,
and summarizing it in a language accessible for the congressmen. It is Congress,
however, that will ultimately decide what weight, if any, to give to the concerns
and critique of the individuals and groups that have commented on the proposed
legislation.
Of course, the process would not be identical to that in the administrative
agencies. Administrative agencies’ rules and actions can be judicially set aside for
failure to follow the proper notice-and-comment procedure or for failure to
consider comments submitted. 195 No such sanction could be imposed on Congress
if it or its own advisory body failed to fully consider the concerns of the public.
After all, unlike administrative agencies that have only whatever authority
delegated to them by Congress, Congress itself retains sovereign authority to enact
whatever laws it deems fit (subject only to the constitutional constraints on its
power). 196 Nonetheless, though the courts would not be in a position to invalidate
congressional laws as “inadequately considered or debated,” the legislative notice
and comment will still have a salutary and constraining function.
192
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First, the notice-and-comment process will, of necessity, slow down some
legislative activity because some time will have to be allocated to actually receive
and evaluate the comments. Though it is true that Congress has not been a bastion
of rapid and efficient decision making, an additional brake on legislation that may
have a far-reaching negative impact on science, technology, and medicine is a
positive thing. As Professor Lazarus points out, oftentimes slowing down such
laws simply preserves the legislative and legal status quo 197—stability that is
usually beneficial for scientific progress. 198
Second, by combining broader public participation with the reasoned
responses both from other members of the public submitting responsive comments,
as well as from the CSO, the notice-and-comment mechanism will lead to a
broader acceptance of the legislative outcome. 199 By giving individuals a real voice
in the legislative process, Congress will help grow confidence that, at least with
respect to issues that turn on objective understanding of scientific realities and
definitions, it has considered and properly weighed the objective evidence, even if
a particular individual disagrees with the weight assigned to his or her own
comments and arguments. 200 Additionally, under an open notice-and-comment
regime, the CSO is less likely to be lobbied or captured by special interest groups.
If the CSO, like an administrative agency, is required by its rules to “respond[] in a
reasoned manner to significant comments received,” 201 it will be less likely that a
few influential individuals or groups would be able to sway the Office’s views.
Indeed, to the extent necessary, the Office can make the comments anonymous
(beyond the educational and experience qualifications) so as to not be swayed by
any personal connections or partisan leanings of the commenter. The fact that the
CSO would not offer any policy prescriptions, but will limit itself only to
analyzing legislation, will further insulate it from the danger of capture.
Third, and related to the second point, the ignoring of clear and specific
criticisms and warnings issued by a neutral, nonpartisan body would serve as good
fodder for intracongressional criticism, as well as campaign commercials. Much
like candidates are now consistently criticized in campaign ads for disregarding the
opinion of the CBO and voting for additional spending or tax cuts that have been
scored as adding to the deficit, 202 so too will candidates be criticized for adopting
legislation that the CSO warned would lead to slowing of scientific progress. This
will be an especially potent tool if in its “progress reports,” the CSO reconfirms its
initial predictions.
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Finally, to the extent the courts consider the “legislative history” of any
particular enactment, especially when applying the Chevron analysis 203 to the
administrative interpretations of the law (as was the case with Sherley v.
Sebelius 204) or when attempting to figure out whether a particular interpretation
would be an “absurd result,” subject to the rule of the Church of the Holy
Trinity, 205 the CSO reports would be of tremendous help. Courts will actually be
able to see whether Congress was warned of the “absurd results” and whether it
enacted legislation despite such warnings. 206 Similarly, the courts (and
administrative agencies) will be able to better evaluate whether the language and
intent of the statute is indeed ambiguous or whether the particular problem, in all
its details, was considered by Congress and a definitive decision reached.
C. The Criticisms and a Response
Had the proposed notice and comment followed by a full CSO report
procedure been in place in 1996, the DWA may have encountered a different fate,
though there are no guarantees that it would necessarily have been so. On one
hand, it is true that the legislative vehicle to which the DWA was attached was
considered, voted on, enacted by Congress, and signed by the President in fewer
than forty-eight hours, thus leaving very little time for any, much less exhaustive,
debate on the riders attached to the bill. 207 Furthermore, given the “must-pass”
nature of the bill and the background of the government shutdown that the bill was
attempting to resolve, there was likely no appetite to debate the particulars.
Thus, the first objection is that it is unlikely that the process this Article
proposes would have had much impact at that initial stage. Indeed, this criticism
can be generalized to argue that the proposed process is unlikely to solve many
problems and will accomplish little more than creating another government
bureaucracy that will succeed only in the proliferation of reports that no one reads.
While certainly the proposal is not a panacea to legislation gratuitously injurious to
the progress of science, it is an improvement over the current process. In the case
of the DWA, though Congress attached the rider to an emergency, must-pass bill, it
does not mean that (a) the proposed system would have had no impact at all on the
likelihood of DWA being enacted or (b) the DWA would have continued to
survive, essentially unchanged, to the present day.
It is certainly the case that when operating under exceedingly narrow time
constraints, the proposed CSO would not be able to engage in a full-blown notice203
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and-comment period, analysis of comments received, and creation of a
comprehensive report for congressmen to debate and consider. But such situations
arise presently both in Congress and also in the administrative agencies. The CBO
often has to work under very tight time constraints to produce cost estimates for
last-minute budgetary compromises. 208 Perhaps such reports are not as
comprehensive as the reports that allow for more detailed study, broader
consultations, and deeper reflection. But such reports are still given significant
weight by congressmen and, eventually, the electorate. There is no reason to
believe that the CSO would be unable to produce its own reports and estimates on
an expedited basis, even if in those cases they would have to forgo the notice-andcomment mechanism. Similarly, administrative agencies also occasionally issue
rules and regulations without engaging in the notice-and-comment process. The
APA permits agencies to forego the process in “emergency situations.” 209 This
exception recognizes that though notice and comment is important, agencies do
have their own expertise and can, in exceptional circumstances, be allowed to rely
on that expertise alone. 210 These exceptions are generally permitted only when the
promulgated rule is temporary, with the permanent rule subject to the full scope of
the APA procedures. 211
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Likewise, legislative riders on annual appropriations bills remain in effect
only for so long as the underlying bill does, and because annual appropriations
bills never last more than a year, neither do restrictions contained therein. Thus,
though the initial restriction may have been enacted under emergency
circumstances leaving no time for full public participation in the CSO process,
nothing would prevent the CSO to conduct a full notice-and-comment procedure in
anticipation of the rider potentially being renewed in a subsequent year. In
emergency circumstances similar to the ones that attended the passage of the
DWA, the initial report would potentially be truncated and somewhat superficial.
In the long term, however, the process would still provide the benefits that this
Article previously identifies. Relatedly, the CSO would be charged not just with
making reports on pending bills, but also year-end estimates on the effect of all
statutes presently in force (as they relate to science and technology). Thus, even if
there were no opportunity to provide notice and comment at the time of a bill’s
initial consideration, there would still be an opportunity to comment on how the
now-enacted bill has actually affected the progress of sciences, thus permitting
Congress to reconsider the bill’s scope when it comes up for reauthorization. Had
this process been in place, the public would have had over a dozen annual
opportunities to comment on the scope and effect of the DWA and explain the
difference between parthenotes and embryos. Congress, presented with a formal
report from the CSO would then have an opportunity to debate and rethink the
renewal of the Amendment as originally written. Of course, Congress may well
have remained unpersuaded, but at least congressmen would have to justify their
approach to each other and/or their constituents.
The second objection to the proposed system—one that also casts doubt on
the proposition that had the system been in place the DWA would have likely
encountered a different fate—is that there are already ways for Congress to obtain
detailed reports on matters of science and that an additional report-producing body
would do little to change the legislative dynamic. After all, the National Institute of
Health’s Human Embryo Research Panel did issue a two-volume report on
embryonic research, and that report did discuss the difference between parthenotes
and embryos, 212 yet Congress enacted the DWA anyway. This Article readily
concedes that Congress could ignore the reports of the CSO just like it ignored the
report of the Human Embryo Research Panel. However, the adoption of the
Article’s proposed system would not be simply duplicative of existing resources
and advisory bodies.
This Article again refers to the CBO. By the time the Congressional Budget
Act created the CBO, the Office of Management and Budget had been in existence
for over half a century. 213 Yet, Congress saw it fit to establish its own independent
nonpartisan office. Though the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) is
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well respected, it is viewed as more partisan than the CBO. 214 It is now the CBO,
not its older sibling the OMB, which has grown to be an authoritative arbiter on
budgetary matters. 215 Perhaps this stems from the fact that Congress is by its very
nature bipartisan (even when a single party has a majority in both chambers), and
therefore, each party has to try to accommodate the other to a certain extent,
whereas the presidency is, of necessity, unipartisan, and the President need not
accommodate anyone in selecting those of his advisors that are not subject to
Senate confirmation. The same dynamic is likely to play out with the CSO.
Though Presidents have had various bodies advising them on scientific and
bioethical issues since 1974, each President has changed the scope and the focus of
these commissions, thus giving the commissions a flavor of partisanship and
allegiance to the appointing administration’s priorities. 216 In contrast, the proposed
CSO would be charged with reporting on every bill having potential impact on
science and technology, thus avoiding the perception that it is focusing on issues
favored by a particular party or individual. Furthermore, the various presidential
commissions were designed to recommend a specific course of action. Indeed, the
present Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues was created
explicitly to “offer[] practical policy options,” to the administration. 217
Commissions with such charge can be perceived as having a stake in the political
outcome rather than serving as a neutral evaluator of congressional proposals. That
posture necessarily makes these bodies partisan, even if not in the traditional
Republican or Democratic sense. Such a perception would undermine the value of
the body to Congress and, therefore, to the legislative process.
Moreover, there is another reason that a Congress-based body for evaluating
scientific issues is preferable to that based in the Executive Branch. As
Congressman Rush Holt pointed out,
Congress needs access to unbiased technical and scientific
assessments finished in a time frame appropriate for Congress,
written in a language that is understood by members of Congress,
and crafted by those who are familiar with the functions of
Congress.
....
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[M]embers of Congress do not suffer from a lack of information,
[but they] lack time and resources to assess the validity,
credibility, and usefulness of the large amount of scientific
information and advice [they] receive as it affects actual policy
decisions. The purpose of the [former Office of Technology
Assessment] was to assist members of Congress in this task. It
both provided an important long-term perspective and alerted
Congress to scientific and technological components of policy that
might not be obvious. 218
Simply put, scientific advisors based in the Executive Branch (or independent
of political branches altogether) are not ideal because they are insufficiently
familiar with congressional procedures, schedules, and language to serve
congressional needs. Furthermore, what Congress needs is not merely the ability to
find general information on a particular topic. That is easy enough to do. What
Congress needs is an evaluation of the likely effect a specific bill is likely to have
on scientific progress. Indeed, though the Human Embryo Research Panel
discussed the nature of parthenotes, it did not discuss why the prohibition on the
use of parthenotes might present significant problems. Thus, congressmen, even if
they had read the Human Embryo Research Panel’s report, would not have
appreciated the full effect of the DWA.
Finally, though the various presidential commissions have done an admirable
job soliciting views of a broad range of scientists, ethicists, patients, and others,
they still lack the formal notice-and-comment format that this Article proposes.
The formal notice-and-comment mechanism with an invitation to participate
extended to every interested individual, rather than just to those that the
commission finds to be worthy of attention, will improve both the legislative
process itself and the public perception of and confidence in the process.
V. CONCLUSION
Mark Twain once quipped, “suppose you were an idiot. And suppose you
were a member of Congress. But I repeat myself.” 219 This Article is somewhat less
cynical about Congress. One of its real problems, among others, is not idiocy, but
lack of digestible, objective, and timely information on complex scientific and
technical issues. In today’s political environment where even scientific issues are
politicized and the public trust in legislators is at an all-time low, 220 we sorely need
a mechanism that provides unbiased assessment of legislative proposals while
increasing public participation in the legislative process, diminishing the influence
218
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of special interests, and educating legislators on the complex scientific and
technical issues. An independent, nonpartisan, CSO modeled on the CBO, which
would provide an opportunity for the experts and public at large to weigh in with
comments on the likely effect of the proposed bills on scientific issues and would
evaluate these comments and produce reports “written in a language that is
understood by members of Congress, and crafted by those who are familiar with
the functions of Congress,” 221 would go a long way toward improving the
legislative process and reducing damage that haphazardly considered legislation
can inflict on scientific progress. Therefore, creating a legislative notice-andcomment process would improve legislation and public confidence and would have
beneficial effects on science. While Congress may not always defer to the concerns
raised by the commenters or the staff at the CSO, the improved quality of
congressional debates—and the increased accountability that will come with
forcing Congress to confront explicit warnings of the scientific community—will
be a marked improvement over the current process of legislating in matters of
science and technology.
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